Representative Writers of the Existentialist Movement
Jan Hendrik Rapar,Th.D., Ph.D.
The desire to make philosophy more anthropocentric is a familiar phenomenon in the history of philosophy. Socrates reacted against the cosmological speculations of the Ionians with his injunction know thyself. His impatience with the Sophists' playing with words is much like the contemporary existentialists' impatience with linguistic analysis. The Stoics, like Socrates, continued the reaction against sophistry and dialectic, as philosophers, on the problems of human suffering and destiny. Traditionally, philosophers had been concerned with the problem of cognition, and the non-cognitive part of man's make-up had been catered to by the mystery religions, by cults, superstitions and customs. The philosophical treatment of the non-cognitive came slowly as indeed was inevitable if intelligibility were taken as the main touchstone for the philosopher. One can see why Socrates, and, centuries later, Luther, are admired so much by the existentialists. Both were men who took a stand, who saw the point beyond which reasons cannot be given and who found in this not the denial of human rationality, but the rationale of man as a human being.
Existentialism is a rejection of the absoluteness of reason. It is a rejection of all purely abstract thinking. The existentialist tries to understand man-in-the-world, man coming to terms with his own particular situation.The existentialist thinker insists that what I really know is not the external world as such, but my own experience. Philosophy therefore, should start from one's own experience, and one's own experience must be admitted as evidence.
H.J. Blackham put it like this: Existentialism ...... is a philosophy of Being, a philosophy of attestation and acceptance, and a refusal of the attempt to rationalize and to think Being. Being can be experienced in a personal venture to which philosophy is the call.
The pedigree of twentieth century existentialism is a Danish thinker Søren Aabye Kierkegaard, who spent his life wrestling with problems of human existence. And it was Kierkegaard who coined the term Aexistentialism. Søren Kierkegaard was born in copenhagen on May 5, 1813. This was the year of national bankruptcy after six years of a desperate and hopeless war with England as an ally of Napoleon. It marked the beginning of the poorest period in Danish history. Søren Kierkegaard was the last of seven children by a second marrieage, to a distant relative living as a servant in the house of Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard, Søren's father. Søren Aabye Kierkegaard died in Copenhagen on November 11, 1855. Paul Roubiczek says:
When Kierkegaard died in 1855, it seemed highly improbable that his work would survive. His books were written in Danish, a language rarely known outside his own country, and he was completely unknown except in Denmark itself where he was a popular figure, ... But today, more than a hundred years after his death, we can say without exaggeration that he is one of the most important philosophers and theologians-if not the most important for our time.
Søren Kierkegaard was a protestant in many senses of the term. He protested against the way in which philosophers had cut off intellect from the inner springs of human existence which alone could give it life. He protested against the philosophy of ideas and the philosophy of things. He protested against all collectives which threatened to swamp men's individuality. He also Apertinaciously challenged his countrymen on their pretensions to christian faith and made the vanity of their German culture the constant target of his attic wit. Kierkegaard reacted against Hegel whom provided the main philosophical fare when he was a student.
It is the mark of Hegel's importance in the history of philosophy that so many philosophical movements which came later defined themselves by the stand they took against him. This is true of Nietzche, Marx, logical positivists and Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard refused to agree that logic could be the key to reality. Mere thought can never encompass the particularity of sensible existences, and for Kierkegaard, the particularity of man in his concrete reality as a living being. Paul Roubiczek explains it like this:
The attempts of philosophers to create abstract metaphysical systems reached their culmination at the beginning of the nineteenth century; Kierkegaard opposed all such attempts, attacking especially Hegel, since it was he who claimed to have found a full explanation of everything, of the universe and man, by his reasoning. Kierkegaard insisted that philosophy should not be abstract, but based on personal experience, on the historical situation in which man finds himself, so thet it could become the basis not of speculation, but of each man=s life. The only evidence to be accepted was that which both could be and had been tested by experience.
To Kierkegaard the Hegelian identification of thought and being was untrue. Existence means precisely the separation of thought and being. As he says a particular existing human being is surely not an idea. Human existence cannot be inferred from thought. The thought is only possibility, not actuality. To contemplate action is not at all the same thing as acting.
Actually, Søren Kierkegaard is a religious thinker, for whom philosophy is subordinate to religion. For Kierkegaard it is religious life whick make us aware of paradox and Athe paradox is above every system Paradox is a mystery, something accessible only to faith. Only faith can comprehend the paradoxes of Christianity, can present a relation to a past figure and belief in a God-man. Such paradoxes are beyond reason. They can only be accepted in faith.
For Kierkegaard there are three stages on life=s way: the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. The first stage, the aesthetic, is presented by Kierkegaard with peculiar poignancy for it shows a mode of existing which he knew well, a way of life which he had himself followed. AAesthetic means >distance from reality=. That is, one transforms life poetically so as to remove its element of sorrow and replace it with pleasure.@ The aesthetic man lives for the hedonist=s and the romantic=s concentration on the happiness of the moment.
In fact, the aesthetic life may require greater skill and ability. The aesthete is the man from whom we learn hoe to enjoy life, but he will always shun a serious effort to understand life because it is disruptive of the moment.
The aesthete, therefore, easily lapses into cynical detachment, that is, into boredom, with its accompaniment of disgust and despair. Living in the present as he does, the aesthete can relate himself neither to the past nor to the future and of these two failures the latter is the more serious as it means that he must remain without hope. This is the stage where all is possible, but where nothing is actual.
At the second stage man for the first time chooses himself. He relates himself to the transcendent as law, and such a course can only be accomplished by a leap, by a complete break with the aesthetic way of life. Instead of drift, the beauty of the moment, we now have action; instead of failure, victory. The distance traversed is immense. The ethical man has a calling, a vocation which goes beyond the mere talent of the aesthetic man. But in being ethical he yet misses the category of the exceptional; he misses being a saint, for the sense of sin which is central to the religious consciousness, is foreign to the ethical mode of existence.
The gulf between the ethical and the religious stages can only be bridged by a leap simply because the latter requires an entirely new element of consciousness, the sense of sin. The manner in which the religious demand may cut across the ethical is exhibited in Abraham's preparedness to sacrifice Isaac. It also shows how the prohibitions of ethics are overrun by the positive injunctions of God. For Kierkegaard, only the religious man is really free.
Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzche
Another writer who may justly be numbered among the patriarchs of Existentialism was the German philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzche. He was born in Röcken on October 15, 1844. His father was a Protestant minister who died before Friedrich was five.
Nietzche and Kierkegaard are as divided as the poles and as close as twins. Nietzche cast his supreme choice upon the finite world which Kierkegaard rejected and resigned. Kierkegaard wrote in flesh and blood his epigram, Nietzche his rhapsody. For both, their drama moved to its inevitable catastrophe: Kierkegaard precipitated himself into the irrevocable either-or of his final unforgiveable attack on the church, Nietzche into his dionysian nihilism his euphoria and eventual madness. Both are impossible, mutilated, pitiable; both are formidable and command respect. Both oppossed themselves to the culture of the day and returned to the greeks. Kierkegaard cast himself for the role of Socrates for the salvation of the age; Nietzche denounced the role of Socrates as the ruin of the age. Both are solitaries, self-driven into isolation. Both are existentialists.
Nietzche relation to the atheist existentialists is very much like Kierkegaard's to the theists. In both we find a confessional style which evokes alternately sympathy and irritation, and a constant breaking through of pathological elements which seem to require the understanding of the clinical expert rather than of the philosopher. In both we find an absence of system. For both as for the other Existentialists, the task of philosophy is not to erect an abstract system divorced from life as it is actually lived, but to reveal a way of life which can be tested by experience.
Nietzche is the first European philosopher in the modern period who spells out what consistent atheism involves. One of his central concerns, as for Sartre, was the nature of artistic activity. In common with Sartre and many other contemporary writers, he finds a well-spring of ideas in the ancient Greek myths. And yet Nietzche is an iconoclast. His mission was to sweep away the shibboleths behind which western man had been sheltering. His aim was to strip men of their illusions.
Bertrand Russel says that Nietzshe admires strength of will above all things. It was from Schopenhauer's The world as will and Idea that Nietzsche derived the idea of will rather than reason as the key to the world. No doubt Nietzsche modified this to suit his own purposes. The metaphysical will which Schopenhauer put in place of Kant's thing-in-itself was conceived by Nietzsche in pluralistic terms, and will per se became transformed for him into Will to Power. Nietzsche regards compassion as a weakness to be combated. Nietzsche and Schopenhauer shared a common interest in the Hellenic world in general and in the poetry of Aeschylus in particular. Schopenhauer's view that the ancient Greeks turned to art to make their sufferings bearable, was also shared by Nietzsche. Schopenhauer's influence, as also Nietzsche's own reflections on the inner meaning of Greek culture, find challenging formulation in his work entitled AThe Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music which appeared in January 1872.
The Birth of Tragedy attempts several things. It tries to show that in Greek tragedy two different approaches to life and art merged; it propounds the Dionysian view of life; and it provides passionate propaganda on behalf of Wagner who himself encouraged its publication. For Nietzsche, the terms Apollonian and Dionysian stand for two types of art and two types of experience. Apollo stands for the plastic arts in which man seeks escape in a realm of beautiful forms. Apollo, the high-browed god of reason, is the god which traditional classical studies extol. Dionysian art and experience, however are presided over by a deity of a very different kind. It is not concerned with the agreeable and the harmonious but with the intoxicating and the demoniac. The Birth of Tragedy is a paean to Dionysos, the artist-god whom Nietzsche puts in place of the god of the theists.
Nietzsche is a great destroyer of myths. His work, nevertheless, provide powerful vindication of the need for myth. The will to Power concept substitutes dynamism in place of static Being, it substitutes man the creator for man the creature. Man the creator is Superman and the Superman is the personification of the will to Power. The Superman is he who knows that God is dead. It was in The Gay Science that Nietzsche related the famous parable of the madman who lit his lantern in Aa bright morning and ran into the market-place, crying incessantly: ... God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. Nietzsche resembles the gods and the heroes of ancient Greece. The Superman will posses the virtues of intellect, energy, virility and self-assertion. Above all, he will posses courage. That such a being will be far in spirit from the kind of being described in the Beatitudes is obvious. And yet that Nietzsche should introduce the concept of the Superman at all is witness to his belief that man is fallen and is in need of redemption. Nietzsche here is seeking a way of overcoming human limits without involving a non-human power. But belief in a Anew man, liberation from the old bondage, the inevitability of suffering and the need to cultivate a certain spiritual heroism -- all these are perfectly compatible with the New Testament world-view.
Nicolas Alexandrovitch Berdyaev
One the best-known Russian Existentialist philosopher is Nicolas Alexandrovitch Berdyaev. He was born in Kiev on March 6, 1874. His father was an officer of the Russian army. In 1920 Berdyaev was professor of philosophy and history at Mascow University. In 1922 he was dismissed for political reasons by the Russian new government. He went to Berlin for two years and then he lived in Paris for the rest of his life. His philosophy is antropocentric. For Berdyaev, man is the essential and fundamental problem:
The essential and fundamental problem is the problem of man-of his knowledge, his freedom, his creativeness. Man is the key to the mystery of knowledge.
Berdyaev's philosophy is also known as personalism. For him, personality is above all an axiological category: it is manifestation of an existential purpose. Personality is the absolute existential centre. Personality is freedom.
The personality is not only related to freedom but cannot exist without it. To realize the personality is therefore to achieve inner freedom, to liberate man from all external determination.
As personality man is unique. AThe secret of the existence of personality lies in its absolute irreplaceability, its happening but once, its uniqueness, its incomparableness.
Berdyaev base his philosophy on the personal freedom. He says: I have put Freedom, rather than Being, as the basis of my philosophy. He also says: All my life I was engaged in hammering out a philosophy of freedom But for him freedom is not a freedom of believe in God; it is just the reverse. He says: Life in God is freedom Nicolas Alexandrovitch Berdyaev died on March 24, 1948.
Of all the philosophers who are in some way or other existentialist it is Karl Jaspers who most of all satisfies Nietzsche's definition of the philosopher as the physician of culture. Karl Jaspers was born on February 23, 1883 in Oldenburg, Westphalia, the son of a bank manger. He came to philosophy from the disciplines of medicine and psychiatry. He was appointed to the chair of philosophy at Heidelberg in 1921, after five years' teaching on the staff. Since 1948 he has been professor of philosophy at Basel. His first major work Allgemeine Psychopathologie, published in 1913, showed how the phenomenological method could be utilized in a field in which it had not been utilized before. His second major work Psychologie der Weltanschauungen published in 1919, showed that he was not only a great psychologist but also a great philosopher. His own knowledge of science, especially medical science protects him from the animus against science, and technology that can be detected in some of the other existentialist writers.
There can be no question that it was to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche that Jaspers owes most in his development as a philosopher. Jaspers regards them both as prophetic figures. But it must not be thought that Jaspers takes over anything from Kierkeggaard and Nietzsche in an unthinking manner. Jaspers does not have either Kierkegaard's or Nietzsche's impatience with institutions, and his deep concern with the ways and means of bringing about human communication is something which is foreign to both his masters.
Jasper=s own view of God is not so clear. He says:
The God of faith is the distant God, the hidden God, the indemonstrable God. Hence I must recognize not only that I do not know God but even that I do not know whether I believe.
Actually, Jaspers rejects both religion and atheism:
He rejects religion because it claims to be authoritative and undertakes to guarantee and to administer the experience of Transcendence, and because it stands for a beyond which is another world, not a beyond which is the upshot, the hidden meaning, of this world, which can only be known out of and by means of the plenitude and deficiencies of life in the world.
Jaspers rejects atheistic positivism Abecause it denies the possibility of Transcendence and because it proceeds to find substitutes which are too obviously faked.
For Jaspers, the relation between man and God is like this:
Man's relation to God is not a quality given by nature. Because it only is in conjuction with freedom it awakens in the individual only when from his mere vital assertion of like he takes the leaps to his self, that is, to the area where authentically from the world, where he can be independent of the world, because he lives in bond with God. God is for me in the degree to which I authentically exist.
Human freedom very evidently is not absolute:
Absolute independence is impossible... There is no isolated freedom. Where there is freedom it struggles with unfreedom, and if unfreedom were fully overcome through the elimination of all resistances freedom itself would cease.
Freedom concerns the will. Jaspers quotes approvingly Kierkegaard's dictum, Athe more will, the more self. But he dissociates him this from any kind of gratuitousness. Actually, freedom is the conquest of arbitrariness. The responsible exercise of freedom is set us a task. For Jaspers, freedom is not the liberty of individuals alone. Jaspers says: A... freedom is never real as the liberty of individuals alone. Every man is free to the extent others are.
It is time to elucidate what Jaspers means by Asituation, for it is in situations that man is called upon to exercise his freedom. For Jaspers, to speak of situations is to speak of involvement. To exist mean to be in a situation. This cannot be avoided. I am in my situation. This cannot be refused. I am in my situation in the world, but I am always ignorant of some aspects of my situation. Situations are constantly changing. They are linked to each other. My very involvement with a situation changes it. Each situation is unique because it is historical, that is to say, in time. But there are also Aboundary situations, universal situation which may be compared to Sartre's general characteristics of the human condition, or Kierkegaard's typology of the stages of human existence. I am always in a particular situation. Then there are particular boundary situations, suffering, struggle, guilt and death, all of which man as an existential being is subject to.
Among the existentialist thinkers Jaspers' contribution is of special importance on many counts. He seems to be the only one who is concerned with the rediscovery of reason in spite of what he calls the ship-wreck of reason. We are called upon to do more than salvage what treasures we can from the shipwreck; we are called apon to venture with confidence in the uncharted seas of tomorrow under the guidance of a reason nourished by the deepest springs of human personality. In one of Jaspers' works he said that his philosophy is a Aphilosophy of reason.
Another writer, a French philosopher, who may be numbered among the theist existentialist was Gabriel Marcel. Marcel was born in 1889. His father was a French Minister in Stockholm. Gabriel Marcel was baptised into the Roman Church in 1929 at the age of 39.
To understand Marcel, certain factors must be borne in mind. During the first work at the Head of the Information Service of the Red Cross made him aware not only of the horrors of war and its consequences but the way in which modern life reduces man to a formula, a number in a list. His personal experience of clash of personalities within the family is reflected in his own plays. His work as drama critic is very much criticism from within. His philosophy is a philosophy of experience. To present a philosophy which shall be from the standpoint of the actor and not the spectator has always been in the foretront of his thinking.
For Marcel, Athe essence of man is to be in a situation. In considering man's relation to the world, Marcel introduces what for him is a most important distinction, that between problem and mystery. For marcel, a problem is something which one hits upon, something which blocks one's way. It is wholly in front of me. A mystery, on the contrary, is something in which I find myself angaged. My own being, then, and being in which I participate are not problem before me... but as a mystery. Problems belong to the world of fear, desire and function, to spheres where the subject-object distinction applies. Problems have solutions, it is true, but one problem tends to lead to another. Along with Marcel's distinction between problem and mystery the polarity of having and being must also be considered. To have means to be able to dispose of. It can also open the way to being dispossessed. So having is always girt about by the fear of loss. Those who have are in a state of tension, and those who have not are in a state of resentment. Being is what withstands analysis. We cannot ask what it is. Being is an experience of transcendence which is a presence, not a substance or an object. ABeing is not reduced to having, but to having is transformed into being. This abolishes the duality and the tension between interior, between what I am and what I have.
Marcel=s work abounds in insights which lead philosophical thinking in new directions. His interpretation of the concrete refers not to the external world, but the most concrete things for him are music, drama and inter-personal relations. He moves away from associating the concrete with the intractable and associates it with the full and peopled. His treating of experience in terms of depth (turning inwards) and the beyond (the horizon) is a good corrective to the usual empiricist one-dimensional view. His comment on empiricism, that its errors is Ato take experience for granted and to ignore its mystery, is well-timed. Experience for him is never a springboard, but always a promised land.
Another thinker who may justly be numbered among the great Existentialists is the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber. He was born in 1878 at viena. His youth was spent in Lemberg (Galicia), Poland at the home of his grandfather, the Hebrew scholar Salomon Buber. Marthin Buber was educated at the Universities of Vienna, Berlin, Leipzig, and Zurich. The work of Martin Buber is recognized as amongst the most important and creative of our time. His influence on such diverse fields of study as psychiatry, philosophy, education and sociology is immense.
Martin Buber's well-known philosophical work is the small book I and Thou. In this book, he distinguishes between two kinds of fundamental relationships. The first relationship is Ich-Es (I-It) and the second is Ich-Du (I-Thou). Buber says that because of this two relationships the I has two natures. The I that related to It is different from the I that related to Thou. The I is never in isolation. AThe is no I as such but only the I of the basic word I-You and the I of the basic word I-It. The basic word I-Thou points to a relation of person to person, of subject to subject, a relation of reciprocity involving meeting or encounter while the basic word I-It points to a relation of person to thing, or subject to object, involving some form of utilization, domination or control, even if it is only so-called objective knowing.
Paul Roubiczek says:
AThe primary word I-It, as Buber calls it, Acannot be said with my whole being. Because the knowledge thus acquired has to be independent of the observer, the I has to exclude certain parts of himself; only certain special faculties are required. On the other hand, Athe primary word I-Thou can be spoken only with the whole being. For the relationship can only arise when the I is completely involved, without any reservations, and fully responding to the impact the other person makes upon him.
The I-Thou relation reach its peak in the relation of I and God as the eternal Thou. For Martin Buber, God is the center of the circle of existence, the apex of the triangle of life. He sees man is essentially oriented to God and life as a summons and a sending. Every man has his unique being as a gift from God, and it is his responsibility to realize it in its wholeness. Martin Buber died in 1965, at Jerusalem, at the age of eightyseven.
One the best-known atheistic Existentialist is the French dramatis, novelist and philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre. He was born in Paris on June 21, 1905. His father died when he was at the age of two. His youth spent at the home of his grandfather, Charles Schweitzer, uncle of Albert Schweitzer. Jean-Paul Sartre studied at the Ecole Normale Superieure in Paris from 1924 to 1928.
To understand Sartre we need to see his analysis of Being into Being-for-itself (L'être-pour-soi) and Being-in-itself (L'être-en-soi) as a model different from the three main erlier dyadic models offered in the history of philosophy i.e. The confrontation of entities, mental and non-mental; the relation of a form-bestowing mind to a manifold; or the filling of a container consciousness with contents thanks to the reception of stimuli from outside. Being-in-itself is what is called an-sich by the Hegelian. To talk about Being-in-itself is to talk about things, events and facts of our environment. Only of things can one say that they are what they are. Being-in-itself is the object of consciousness.
The object of consciousness is what it is; it is wholly there, totally given, without any separation from itself; it is not possibility, it is itself, it is in itself; uncreated, without any reason, without any relation with another being, being-in-itself has been eternelly de trop.
If Being-in-itself is what it is there is no question of what it might be. We are here listening to an echo of Aristotle. The view that Being-in-itself cannot be reduced to the necessary, shows Sartre's distance not only from eighteenth century rationalism but from the scientific viewpoint. There can be no explanation of how or why things are what they are. They just are.
Being-for-itself is all the things which Being-in-itself is not. It is Being-for-itself which introduces a fissure in Being, from which stems movement, the possibility of change. Take an example. It is conciousness which transforms the blank sheet of paper into a sheet covered with writing, or into a paper boat. Being-for-itself is different from the Being-in-itself so they have to be separated. But Being-for-itself is dependent upon Being-in-itself.
These two modes of being, consciousness and its object, the pour-soi and the en-soi, are not, merely in contrast. Consciousness absolutely requires the given objective world. It only comes into existence as separation from what is there. Consciousness cannot be deduced from the world, which is independent and self-sufficient. The world can be deduced from consciousness; not because consciousness is prior and independent, but because it comes into the world as nothing, as not the world, and gives the world as there. Consciousness is thus relative to the objective world and dependent upon it.
Sartre's view of man is that man is dumped into the world. Whether he likes it or not, he has to work out his own values. He cannot avoid making choices. And what he chooses all contributes towards making him the kind of person that he is becoming. Sartre says that Aman is nothing else but what he makes of himself. Such is the first principle of existentialism. Man becomes rather than is. This means that man is always in the making. He has to define himself by his acts. Sartre says: Aman is nothing else but his plan; he exist only to the extent that he fulfills himself; he is therefore nothing else than the ensemble of his acts, nothing else than his life.
Man is never fixed at any time. He is always the product of what he does, thinks and chooses. Actually, man creates himself by making choices. "... in creating the man that we want to be, there is not a single one of our acts which does not at the same time create an image of man as we think he ought to be." Man tries to be what he thinks he ought to be. And all the time hanging over him is the prospect of death and the anxieties which are part and parcel of his lonely existence. Man is right to persue high ideas, but death mocks everything and in the end brings everything to nothing. Jan-Paul Sartre died in 1980.
It is clearly seen that the peculiarity of existentialism... is that it deals with the separation of man from himself and from the world... With this the existentialists try to understand man-in-the world, man coming to terms with his own particular situation. For existentialists, the separation is the foundation of all foundations, and to abolish it is a total reconciliation is to undermine personal existence itself.
Existentialist treatments of freedom owe much to the battlecry of the French revolution. But liberty apart from equality and fraternity can be a dangerous thing.
Existentialist accounts of action suffer from their non-egological treatment of the consciousness on the one hand, and their neglect of sociology on the other. But actually, existentialism is still very influential in this century thought.
Existentialist thinkers have done a great deal to make philosophy more anthropocentric, whatever their failings may have been.
Berdyaev, N.A., Dream and Reality. Trans. Lampert, Katherine,
London: Geoffrey Bless, 1950.
_________, Solitude and Society. Trans. Reavery, George, London:
Geoffrey Bless, 1938.
Beerling, R.F., Filsafat Dewasa Ini. Jakarta: P.N. Balai Pustaka,
Bertens, K., Filsafat Barat Dalam Abad XX. Jakarta : Penerbit
_________, Ringkasan Sejarah Filsafat. Yogyakarta: Penerbit
Yayasan Kanisius, 1981.
Blackham, H.J., Six Existentialist Thinkers. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1978.
Hamersma, Harry, Tokoh-tokoh Filsafat Barat Modern. Jakarta:
P.T. Gramedia, 1983.
Hasan, Fuad, Berkenalan dengan Existentialisme. Jakarta: Pustaka
Jaspers, Karl, Existentialism and Humanism. Trans. Ashton, E.B.,
New York: Russel F. Moore Comp. Inc., 1932.
__________, Way to Wisdom; An Introduction to Philosophy.
Trans. Manhein, Ralp, New Haven: Yale Unive. Press, 1951.
Kierkegaard, Soren, Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Trans.
Swenson, David F., Lowrie, Walter, Princeton: Princeton
Univ. Press, 1946.
Roosjen, S., Irasionalisme. Jakarta : Badan Penerbit Kristen, 1957.
Roubiczek, Paul, Existentialism: for and against. Cambridge:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1966.
Russel, Bertrand, History of Western Philosophy. London: George
Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1965.
Sartre, Jean-Paul, Existentialism and Human Emotions. Trans.
Frechtman, Bernard, New York: Philosophical Library, 1948.
Sontag, Frederick, A Kierkegaard Handbook. Atlanta: John Knox
 H.J.Blackham, Six Existentialist Thinkers (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 149-150.
 Frederick Sontag, A Kierkegaard Handbook (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1978), p. 1.
 Fuad Hassan, Berkenalan dengan Existensialisme (Jakarta: Pustaka Jaya, 1973), p. 14.
 Paul Roubiczek, Existentialism: for and against (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1966), p. 55.
 Blackham, p. 1.
 Blackham, p. 2.
 Roubiczek, p. 55.
 Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscripts, trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1946), p. 112.
 Kierkegaard, p. 298.
 Kierkegaard, p. 280.
 Sontag, p. 14.
 Sontag, p. 19.
 Blackham, p. 23.
 Harry Hamersma, Tokoh-tokoh Filsafat Barat Modern (Jakarta : Penerbit PT Gramedia, 1983), p. 79.
 Bertrand Russel, History of Western Philosophy (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1965), p. 730.
 S. Roosjen, Irasionalisme (Jakarta : Badan Penerbit Kristen, 1957), p. 31.
 Roosjen, pp. 28-29.
 Hamersma, p. 81.
 K. Bertens, Ringkasan Sejarah Filsafat (Yogyakarta : Penerbitan Yayasan Kanisius, 1981), p. 89.
 Roubiczek, p. 40.
 Fuad Hassan, p. 59.
 N.A. Berdyaev, Solitude and Society, trans. George Reavery (London: Geoffrey Bless, 1938), p. 122.
 Berdyaev, p. 122.
 Fuad Hassan, p. 68.
 N.A. Berdyaev, Dream and Reality, trans. Katherine Lampert (London: Geoffrey Bless, 1950), p. 46.
 Berdyaev, Dream and Realitry, p. 46.
 Berdyaev, Dream and Reality, p. 53.
 Fuad Hassan, p. 75.
 Fuad Hassan, p. 75.
 Karl Jaspers, Way to Wisdom ; an Introduction to Philosophy, trans. Ralp Manhein. (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1951), pp. 50-51.
 Blackham, p. 62.
 Blackham, p. 62.
 Karl Jaspers, p. 65.
 Karl Jaspers, p. 115.
 Karl Jaspers, Existentialism and Humanism, trans. E.B. Ashton (New York: Russel F. Moore Comp., Inc., 1952), p. 78.
 Fuad Hassan, pp. 78-79.
 R.F. Beerling, Filsafat Dewasa Ini (Jakarta: P.N. Balai Pustaka, 1966), pp. 246-249.
 Blackham, p. 68.
 Blackham, p. 69.
 Blackham, p. 69.
 Beerling, p. 250.
 Blackham, p. 71.
 K. Bertens, Filsafat Barat dalam Abad XX (Jakarta: Penerbit P.T.Gramedia, 1981), p. 164.
 Bertens, Filsafat Barat Dalam Abad XX, p. 164.
 Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. W. Kaufmann. (Edinburgh, 1970), p. 54.
 Bertens, Filsafat Barat Dalam Abad XX, p. 164.
 Roubiczek, p. 141
 Bertens, Filsafat Barat Dalam Abad XX, p. 165.
 Hamersma, p. 108.
 Beerling, p. 228.
 Blackham, p. 111.
 Blackham, p. 111.
 Jean-Paul Sartre, Exixtentialist and Human Emotions, trans. Bernard Frechtman. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948), p. 15.
 Sartre, p. 32.
 Sartre, p. 17.
 Beerling, p. 230.
 Blacham, p. 151.
 Blackham, p. 151.